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Introduction
Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of all-pay strategic contests for a given prize. In such contests the single winner depends on the efforts invested by the contestants. Applications of these contests include promotional competitions, litigation, internal labor market tournaments, rent-seeking, R&D races, political and public policy competitions and sports, Epstein and Nitzan (2007) , Konrad (2009 ), Congleton et al. (2008 . Endogenous determination of such contests may involve all of their relevant institutional characteristics. These are typically determined by contest designers; economic and political entrepreneurs who wish to maximize the efforts made by the contestants. Most of the literature on optimal contest design has focused on the choice of the contest prize, the set of contestants, the structure of multi-stage contests, caps on political lobbying, and the contest success function, CSF, the function that relates the contestants' efforts to their winning probabilities. In the current study we focus on the design of logit CSF's that include the two most widely studied types of mechanisms: Tullock's type lotteries and all-pay-auctions. We show that in asymmetric contests with different prize valuations, the endogenously determined lottery always yields certain efforts that are larger than or equal to the expected efforts in an APA.
We first study fair non-discriminating logit CSF's, as in Alcalde and Dahm (2010) and Nti (2004) , allowing control of the exponent determining the particular form of the logit CSF. In this context, Fang (2002) has shown that a fair simple lottery can be superior to an all-pay-auction and induce larger efforts, if the gap between the contestants' prize valuations is sufficiently large. 1 Our main result considerably extends his finding. It establishes that the optimal fair (non-discriminating) lottery is always superior to the all-pay-auction (APA). That is, it yields larger efforts regardless of the gap between the contestants' stakes. We then extend the setting by allowing discrimination, that is, control of another parameter that determines the preferential treatment received by one of the contestants, as in Lien (1986 Lien ( ), (1990 , Clark and Riis (2000) and, more recently, Franke (2012), Epstein et al. (2011) . Such discrimination is commonly observed in real political-economic contest environments, and, particularly, in the public sector (For a detailed discussion of the empirical relevance of discrimination and its control by contest designers see Epstein 1 See also Epstein and Gang (2009). 3 et al. (2011) and Franke et al. (2011) ). By our second result, when discrimination is allowed, the designer's payoff under the optimal discriminating lottery is equal to his expected payoff under the optimal discriminating APA.
Given our assumption of common knowledge of the contestants' prize valuations, the contest designer could resort to a mechanism that completely extracts the higher prize valuation. Focusing on contests with logit CSF's actually implies that we rule out such mechanisms. In other words, the contestants in our setting are in fact assumed to be protected from complete extraction of their surplus because they are ensured that in the contest equilibrium their participation is minimally effective; in equilibrium every contestant makes a positive effort with positive probability and has a positive probability of winning the contested prize. 2 The focus on logit lotteries conforms therefore to a legal constraint that contests induce participation and that the designer cannot induce efforts that exceed, as we shall see, the average value of the contested prize.
It should be noted that the logit CSFs can be justified either axiomatically or on the grounds of common use in practice. In any event, they are the most widely studied functions in the contest literature. Despite their popularity, it must be admitted that it remains an open question whether some other CSFs, while still ensuring minimally effective participation of the contestants, can yield better results for the contest designer. Nevertheless, and more importantly, since we prove the superiority of Tullock-type lotteries over the APA in fair contests, and since we prove the equivalence of the optimal lottery and the optimal APA in unfair-discriminating contests, which implies that a risk averse designer would prefer the optimal lottery, our assumption regarding the restriction imposed on the designer (the selection of a CSF that belongs to the particular family of a logit lotteries), is justified because it is sufficient to raise doubt regarding the apparent belief regarding the superiority of APA as a means of generating revenue for the contest designer.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2, we present the model, the optimal contest design approach that allows discrimination and the two types of contest success functions, APAs and Tullock's logit lotteries. Section 3 contains the main result which establishes the inferiority of the APA relative to the 2 The existence of effective incentives of participation precludes the direct abolition of competition by exclusion of contestants or the indirect abolition of competition by application of a Tullock CSF that for some contestants is always unresponsive to their effort, as in Nti (2004). 4 endogenous lottery, when the contestants have different prize valuations. The equivalence between the optimal lottery and APA under discrimination is established in Section 4. The novelty of our contribution relative to the literature is clarified in Section 6. Concluding remarks are included in Section 6. All the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
Optimal contest design a. The setting
In the basic one-stage contest setting, there are two risk-neutral contestants, the high and low benefit contestants, 1 and 2. The prize valuations of the contestants are denoted by i n , 2 1 n n  or 1 2 1   n n k
. We assume that the designer has full knowledge of the contestants' prize valuations. Given these valuations and the CSF, the function that specifies the contestants' winning probability given their efforts,
where 1 x and 2 x denote the contestants' efforts. In the extended optimal contest design setting, the objective function of a third player, the designer of the contest, is:
The contest designer is assumed to maximize his objective function (2) by setting the CSF, anticipating the Nash equilibrium efforts of the contestants that are obtained in the standard contest where the payoff functions of the contestants are given by (1) and the CSF is set by the designer. As already mentioned in the introduction, we focus on the widely studied CSFs that include APAs and Tullock's lotteries. 3
b. All-Pay Auctions
Under an APA, the certain winner is the contestant who makes the largest effective effort, where a unit of effort by one contestant is not necessarily equally effective as a unit of effort of his rival, as first suggested in the context of a bribery game by Lien 5 (1986), (1990) and later on by Clark and Riis (2000) . That is, the CSF for 0   is an APA given by:
, where the discrimination variable 0   is selected by the contest designer. By (3), a reduction in  increases the bias in favor of the more 
c. The logit lotteries
Under a lottery, every contestant has some positive winning probability. Sufficiently large investment of effort can secure a high probability of winning, but not certain winning. Our optimality and neutrality results are confined to the well studied logit Tullock-type lotteries. For 0   , these lotteries are given by: 4
, where  and  are selected by the contest designer. The interpretation of  is as in sub-section (b).
Fair contests
As in Alcalde and Dahm (2010) and Nti (2004) 
, one can easily see that for    the logit lottery takes the form (3). The form in (4) is slightly different from the form of the logit lottery in Epstein et al. (2011) because in the present study, as will become clear in the sequel, it is important to make a meaningful comparison between the degree of discrimination under the two types of CSFs. Such comparison requires that discrimination is defined in a similar way in the two cases.
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In equilibrium of the unbiased APA, Hillman and Riley (1989) 
b. The optimal unbiased lottery
With asymmetric prize valuations and 1   , it is known that in equilibrium 2 1 2 1 n n n n G L   is larger than A G , provided that the gap between the contestants' stakes is sufficiently large, that is, 2 1  k , see Fang (2002) . Our first result considerably strengthens this finding by establishing that in a fair contest, if 1 k  , then a designer who can select the exponent  , always prefers a lottery because it yields larger efforts relative to the APA, even when Fang's sufficient condition is not satisfied.
Proposition 1:
If discrimination is not feasible, 1  k and the designer can select the exponent  , then there exists a value in the range 2 0    that yields certain contestants' efforts that are larger than the expected efforts obtained under the APA.
(For a proof, see Appendix A).
This result implies that, in a fair contest, if 1  k , then a Tullock-type lottery is always preferred to the APA by a risk neutral or a risk averse designer. Alcalde and Dahm (2010) have shown that for any 2   there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies that is equivalent to the equilibrium of the APA. However, so far a characterization of the complete set of mixed-strategy equilibria is not available. , a designer setting an optimal  for a pure-strategy equilibrium must choose an exponent  which is smaller than 2. Furthermore, in a pure-strategy equilibrium the designer may choose an exponent that is smaller than that  which causes contestant 2's utility to be equal to zero. In other words, in equilibrium contestant 2's utility can be positive. This has been shown by Nti (2004) for a sufficiently large value of k (see Section 4 in his paper). However, for lower values of k, but still 1  k ,  reduces contestant 2's utility to zero. 5 In any case, as explained above, for 1  k the optimal  for a pure-strategy equilibrium is smaller than 2,
, the contest equilibrium is in mixed strategies, the total expected efforts are equal to   1 2 1 2 2n n n n G L   and the surplus of contestant 2 is completely eliminated. It remains to explain why the designer prefers the optimal pure-strategy equilibrium to the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Notice that in the move from equilibrium in pure strategies to equilibrium in mixed strategies  is increased,
. 6 The increase in  increases the winning probability of contestant 1 and reduces the winning probability of contestant 2. However, contestant 1 is induced to reduce his efforts in the mixed-strategy equilibrium corresponding to the larger  because this further increases his expected utility. Such reduction is , the parameter  in the logit CSF on which we focus, that yields the largest efforts is not    , since there is some  which is smaller than 2 that yields larger efforts.
Unconstrained contests
In the unconstrained environment that allows discrimination, anticipating the investments of the contestants, the designer optimally determines the parameters of the contest's success functions. When considering the APA the designer controls the degree of discrimination  . When considering the logit lottery he determines both  and the exponent  .
Most of the literature studying Tullock's lotteries and the APA disregarded deliberate discrimination between the contestants and control of the exponent  .
However, in the context of an APA, Lien (1986), (1990) and Clark and Riis (2000) studied a bribery game in which a designer exercises discrimination in a multiplicative form. Michaels (1988) and Nti (2004) . 10 We therefore obtain: 8 Note that under the logit CSF where 2 0    the exerted efforts are certain whereas under the APA the meaning of efforts is expected efforts. 9 We suggest the following intuition regarding the equilibrium outcome and its sensitivity to 
The designer tends to support the contestant with the lower prize valuation ( k  *  ) to attain complete "balance" between the wining probabilities for any given  , 2 0    . An increase in  induces the contestants to increase their effort at the same rate in order to increase their winning probability. Since at the same time the designer favorably discriminates the contestant with the lower prize valuation, the equilibrium winning probability is unchanged, 5 . 0  i p . But by raising  the designer increases the aggregate efforts. The designer therefore prefers the highest possible  , 2   , that enables him to extract the maximal possible surplus from the contestants which reduces their net payoff to zero. 10 Note that this result has the flavor of the neutrality result of Alcalde and Dahm (2010). However, in our setting of optimal contest design, the contestants' maximal efforts are larger than those obtained in the symmetric setting of Alcalde and Dahm (2010) . This is due to the allowed control of both  and  . Also note that the question whether the equilibrium aggregate effort in a contest with 2   exceed that when 2   or    is open, although we conjecture that it does not.
Proposition 2:
If the contest designer can select both the degree of discrimination  , 0   , and the exponent  , then the contestants efforts under the optimal lottery are equal to the expected efforts in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the optimal APA.
The combined effect of optimal discrimination k   and optimal selection of the exponent  in the logit CSF
that gives rise to a pure-strategy equilibrium when 2 0    , results in equal (expected) efforts and elimination of the surplus of both of the contestants. This result implies that the optimal logit lottery (that need not satisfy the constraint 2 0    ) cannot be dominated by the APA.
Proposition 2 establishes that the intuition mentioned above that a larger exponent  would induce greater expenditures is, again, not valid. Under optimal discrimination, even the use of an optimal APA by designers who are maximally receptive to the contestants' efforts, would not induce greater efforts than those obtained by designers who are less receptive to the contestants' efforts, 2 *   , allowing random winning. Recall that in both cases bids are optimally discriminated, the optimal degree of discrimination being equal to k. Nevertheless, the valid part of the above intuition is that a larger exponent  indeed induces greater efforts under the logit lottery provided that the exponent  gives rise to a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Relationship to the literature
To clarify the novelty of our results, let us discuss the difference between the two settings we have focused on and the settings examined in Fang (2002), Epstein et al.
(2011), Epstein and Nitzan (2006) and Franke et al. (2011 ). Fang (2002 has shown that, under asymmetric prize valuations, a simple lottery yields larger efforts than the expected efforts under an APA provided that the gap between the contestants' stakes is sufficiently large. Our first result, Proposition 1, considerably strengthens this result by establishing that in a fair contest ( 1   ), if 1 k  , then a designer who can select the exponent  , always prefers a logit lottery to an APA, even when Fang's sufficient condition is not satisfied. In fact, the exponent of the preferred lottery satisfies 0 ( ) 2 k   , which means that the corresponding contest game has a unique pure-strategy equilibrium.
Epstein et al. (2011) have studied an extended setting where discrimination is allowed, the objective function of the contest designer is a weighted average of the contestants' expected welfare and their aggregate expenditures, however, the exponent  is given and restricted to 1   . They have not dealt therefore with our first setting where the entire weight is put on efforts because we have not allowed discrimination.
They have also not dealt with our second setting where the entire weight is put on efforts and discrimination is allowed because, first, we have allowed the contest designer to control  and, second, we have dealt with a less restricted  , 2   . No wonder than that our two results differ from Proposition 5 in Epstein et al. (2011) that establishes the superiority of the optimal APA relative to any optimal lottery.
Epstein and Nitzan (2006) compared between the contestants' efforts under an
APA and a lottery assuming that discrimination is not allowed where both  and k are given (clearly, the assumed  need not be the optimal exponent corresponding to the given parameter k). The first settings in the current paper is fundamentally different because the exponent  is assumed to be optimally determined by the contest designer, given the parameter k. APA and the optimal simple lottery in an extended n-player contest with discrimination. They have been able to prove the superiority of the APA assuming a simple lottery, viz., 1   . They have not allowed, however, control of the exponent  as in our second setting where 2   . Hence their main result differs from our Proposition 2 that establishes the equivalence between the performance of the optimal APA and the optimal lottery.
Conclusion a. Extraction of the contestants' surplus and the designer's payoff
In the unconstrained environment that allows discrimination, the designer always captures all the surplus of the two contestants. In the constrained fair environment, this is not the case although under the APA the designer always captures the surplus 12 of contestant 2. The difference between the two competitive environments is the extent of the contestants' incentives to make efforts. This hinges on the possibility of discrimination between the contestants. The possibility of discrimination increases the intensity of competition enabling the designer to increase his payoff.
b. The shadow price of the competitiveness constraint
The competitiveness constraint means that we deal with interior contest equilibria such that the ability of the contest designer to induce efforts is limited to the average value of the contested prize. Without this constraint, the designer could yield a total effort of 1 n by excluding the rivals of the contestant with the maximal valuation of the contested prize and then exploiting his political power or bargaining advantage to extract (almost) all his surplus, as in Nti (2004). We should point out that several different mechanisms can be used to implement the optimal design. For example, we could use an auction mechanism where the prize is awarded to the highest bidder but the contest designer has a reserve price equal to 1 n (see Glazer, 1993) or, alternatively, use a first-price APA with a reservation price of 1 n (see Hillman and Riley, 1989) . The CSFs on which we focus do conform to the competitive environment and the maximal efforts are equal to   . This is then the price of competition for the designer.
c. The shadow price of the equalitarian constraint
Equalitarianism results in reduced payoff for the designer relative to the unconstrained environment when 1  k . In this case the shadow price of this constraint is positive, the exact value depending on the gap between the contestants' prize valuations that gives a Tullock's lottery a clear-cut advantage over the APA, as implied by Proposition 1. This may certainly support an ideology protecting the equalitarian 'welfare state'. Simply, in our setting, such equalitarianism limits the ability of the political-economic entrepreneur to extract resources from the contestants.
d. Generalization to n-player contests
A potential interesting extension of our study is the analysis of the multiple-player case. Results for the all-pay auction should be robust with respect to the number of players because only two players will actively participate in equilibrium. This is not the case for lotteries. However increasing the number of contestants intensifies competition so our results might remain valid for more than two contestants both in fair and unfair contests. The case of optimal discrimination by control of the bias scheme has been recently analyzed in Franke et al. (2011) 
Under such equality the expected utility of contestant 2 is equal to zero. Equality The reason is that an increase in k reduces  and for 
